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LAWYER 
Tempia, Turner, McOmber and the 
Military Rules of Evidence: A }light to 
Counsel Trio with the New Look 
CPT(P) David A. Schlueter 
· Instructor, Criminal Law Division 
TJAGSA 
Several significant developments in the law 
of military interrogations warrant an exami-
nation of a military suspect's rights to counsel. 
Fh·st, a seiies of Court of Military Appeals 
decisions within the last year or so have either 
clarified or expanded military case law on mili-
tary interrogations. Secondly, and most im-
portant, the pending new Military Rules of 
Evidence' will ··implement a large amount of 
military case law, in some instances alter exist.., 
ing law and on the whole moreclosely align the 
military interrogation practices with prevail-
ing civilian· rules. Analysis of these develop-
ments will center on the three key facets of the 
service member's right to counsel at military 
interrogations: 
-Fifth Amendment Rights: The Miranda-
Tempia Right to Counsel Warnings; 
-Sixth Amendment Rights: Right to Con-
sult with Counsel During Interrogations; 
and 
-Article 27, U.C.M.J. Rights: Notice to 
Suspect's Counsel of Pending Interroga-
tion. 
At least one of the foregoing rights will raise 
its head at any given interrogation. And al-
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though occasionally, two or more will be raised 
in any given interrogation case, each will be 
here treated separately. Likewise, counsel who 
are faced with litigating the admissibility of 
an accused's statement should initially ap-
proach the right to counsel issues separately, 
beginning with an analysis of the applicable 
right to counsel warnings. It is that facet to 
which we first turn. 
I. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL WARNINGS 
The fifth amendment right to remain silent 
serves as the keystone for the rights warnings 
requirements mandated by the Supreme Court 
in Miranda v. Arizona. 2 Citing numerous 
works,· statistics, and plain common sense, the 
Court recognized the vital need for insuring the 
option for a suspect to either remain silent or 
to make a voluntary statement. In particular, 
the police station interrogation was all too 
often equated with coercion, deception, and 
intimidation. Resisting arguments that police 
functions would be fatally undermined, the 
Court mandated the now familiar Mirarnda 
warnings. a. Despite efforts to modify Miranda 
through judicial and legislative4 channels, the 
case stands. More important is that the appli-
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cation of the Miranda warnings stands and is 
applicable to military interrogations through 
the Court of Military Appeals' decision in 
United States v. Tempia. 5 The present-day ap-
plicability of the Mirand(};-Tempia decisions to 
military interrogations centers on a number of 
recurring issues: 
-Delineating who must give the warnings; 
-The definition of "custodial interrogation" 
-The scope of the right to "counsel"; 
-Waiver of the right to counsel; and 
-The Miranda exclusionary rule. 
The following discussion will in turn center on 
each of these issues with attention being given 
to recent case law and the pending rules changes 
in the Manual for Courts-Martial. We first ad-
dress the question of who must give the right 
to counsel, the Miranda-Tempia, warnings. 
A; Who Is Required to Give the Miranda-
Tempia Warnings? 
The Miranda decision requires that the coun-
sel warnings be given by law enforcement 
officers.6 The 1969 Manual for Courts-Martial 
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provisiOn noted t}lat the Article ,31 (b) warn-
ings7 and the right to counsel warnings were 
to be given by persons "subject to the code or 
acting as an instrument of such a person or a 
unit of the armed force." 8 
The new Military Rules of Evidence· provi-
sion on this point also links the Miranda warn-
ings with Article 31 (b) warnings. and states 
that the right to counsel warnings must be 
given by persons subject to the Uniform Code 
of Military Justice.9 By definition. those persons 
knowingly acting as an "agent of a military 
unit or of a person subject to the Uniform Code 
of Military Justice" must also give the Miranda 
warnings.10 
The linkage between Article. 31 (b) warnings 
and the Miranda warnings is not new to mili-
tary case law which in the past has often rested 
upon the Article 31 (b) "persons subject to the 
Code" language in determining who must give 
the Miranda warnings.U However, it is clear 
that not everyone subject to the Code need give 
Miranda warnings-'-only those acting in either 
an official capacity12 or those in a position of 
authority13 over the suspect and then only when 
the suspect is in "custody." 
Civilian investigators questioning a service 
member are of course bound by the Miranda 
requirements but foreign investigators are not 
necessarily so bound. A recent example of this 
was presented in United States v. Jones14 where 
German law enforcewent agents interrogated 
the accl.J,s.ed "for theben~fit of the Germ~mGov­
ernmEmi:•1s His siatements to the foreign police 
were admitted into evidence at his court-
martial over the defense objection that no 
proper Miranda warnings had been given. The 
Court of Military Appeals held that the German 
interrogators were not required to give any 
Miranda warnings because under the facts pre-
sented they had not acted as "instrumentali-
ties" of military authoritieS.16 Had military 
investigators played an active role in t.he iJ;J,ter-
rogation or had the German~ condu9t.ed ~··~he 
interrogation at the request of military author-
ities, the accused's argument would have no 
doubt prevailed.17 
3 
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Another permutation of the question of who 
must give the warnings relates to the oft-used 
police tactic of using informants or police in an 
undere"over capacity to elicit incriminating evi-
dence from suspects. Absent possible sixth 
amendment problems, civilian courts generally 
have little problem in relieving the questioners 
from giving the Miranda warnings; if not for 
policy reasons, at least for the reason that most 
of the undercover activity is not "custodial."18 
To date, the military courts, with only a few 
exceptions,19 have not required warnings. Here 
too, the military courts have co:r;npared the 
Article 31 (b) warnings with the Miranda 
warnings. If the military interrogator need not 
give warnings under Art.icle a1, no Miranda 
warnings are required. 20 
The practice of using informants. WBt!:L.re-
cently examined i11 Un,ited States. v. Kirby21 
where Air Force IC~g~nts ~s;c!f the. ;oiun-
teered services of the accused's :roo:rnmate. to 
reco~er so1lle . sta"I~n p~operty. · The CoiirC of 
Miiitary Appeals could find .no requirement to 
warn and noted that the informant:whoV'olun-
teered his services had notacted iu an offiCial 
capacity although the OSI officewas aware that 
he would attempt to obtain the contraband. The 
court specifically declined to set out a "compre-
hensive statement of the precise characteristics 
of officiality where the other party is not a per-
son known to the. acc\lsed a:::;. ala:w enforcement 
officer or a superior.'•22 
However, Rule 312(d) (1) (B). discussed in 
the next section. requires that undercover 
agents or infQtm::tnts :r;nust give right to coun-
sel warnings if the suspect has peen charged or 
is in some form of pretrial restraint. 
B. Custodial Interrogations 
Once the initial question of deciding "who" 
must give the Miranda warnings is settled, the 
issue {)f ''when'' the warnings· must be given 
may adaressed. That issu~. may be further 
reduced to two points: The definition of "cus-
tody" and the definition of "interrogation." 
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First, as to the element of custody, the 
Miranda warnings, according the the Supreme 
Court, were required when questioning was 
initiated by law enforcement officers after a 
person was taken in custody or otherwise de-
prived of his freedom of action in any signifi-
cant way. 23 The new provision in the Military 
Rules of Evidence, Rule 305 (d) (1), states that 
counsel warnings are required when: 
(A) ... [T] he accused or suspect is in cus-
tody, could reasonably believe himself or her-
self to be in custody, or is othe1-wise deprived 
of his or her freedom () f action in any signifi-
cant way; or 
(B) The interrogation is conducted by a per-
son subject to the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice acting in a law enforcement capacity, 
or an agent of such a person, the interroga-
tion is conducted subsequent to preferral or 
charges or the imposition of pretrail restraint 
under paragraph 20 of this Manual, and the 
interrogation concerns the offenses or mat-
ters that were the subject of the preferral of 
charges ot· were the cause of the imposition 
of pretrial restraint. 24 
Note that this provision expands the require-
ment of warnings to situations which may not 
necessarily be "custodial" but occur after pre-
ferral of charges or pretrial restraint. Deter-
mining whether the suspect has been charged 
or is in restraint should provide no problems. 
Unfortunately for the practitioner, few hard 
and fast rules apply in defining "custody." An 
imprisoned suspect has normally been consid-
ered to be in custody25 but not all police-station 
interrogations are custodial.26 Conversely, not 
all interrogations conducted in the surroundings 
familiar to the suspect are necessarily non-
custodial. 27 
While the Supreme Court is apparently lim-
iting those situations which might normally be 
considered custodial28 the military courts do not 
reveal an eagerness to so reduce the impact of 
Miranda. That is probably true in part to the 
recognition by the courts of the subtle, inherent 
coerciveness, that of necessity exists in the 
military. 29 But again, not all military interro-
4 
gations are custodial nor does the superior-
subordinate relationship between interrogator 
and suspect necessarily in and of itself require 
a finding of custody. ao 
To meet the task of determining whether the 
suspect was in custody, the various state, fed-
eral, and military courts have relied on several 
different tests: the subjective intent of the 
questioner, the subjective intent of the suspect, 
and an objective test.31 Application of either of 
the first two obviously presents a possibility for 
judicial swearing contests. The objective test, 
applied by at least one federal circuit court32 
and apparently adopted in a military decision, 
United States v. Temperley,33 has apparently 
been incorporated in large part in the new 
military evidence rules. 34 The new military test, 
a hybrid of sorts, requires at least some consid-
eration of the circumstances of the interroga-
tion through the eyes of the suspect. The intent 
of the interrogator is apparently not a factor 
under the new rule. 
The second portion of the inquiry of when 
the warnings are required turns on the defmi-
tion of "interrogation." Miranda speaks simply 
in terms of "questioning" although more recent 
Supreme Court decisions have expanded the 
requirement to those situations where the in-
terrogators engaged in conversations designed 
to elicit incriminating information. A striking 
example of this is the now well-recognized con-
versation, the "Christian Burial Speech," initi-
ated by the detective in Brewer v. Williams. 35 
The military courts have likewise adopted a 
broader application of "interrogation" to in-
clude eonversations or discussions. In United 
States v. Borodzik,36 for example, the Court of 
Military Appeals indicated that: 
When conversation is designed to elicit a re-
sponse from a suspect, it is interrogation, 
regardless of the subtlety of the approach. 97 
A fascinating example of the "subtle" approach 
occurred in United States v. Fox88 where the 
interrogator stopped to chat with the suspect. 
He engaged him in a two-hour long "cat-and 
mouse" game-a game successfully thwarted 
by the mouse, according to the court. Ironically, 
-., 
after the so:..called chat had ended, the suspect 
voh1lltarily implicated himself. 39 The court 
sustained the conviction but cautioned against 
such police practices. 
. The broader definitional approa~h to interro-
gation has been incorporated in the new Mili-
tary Rules of Evidence. Rule 305 (b) (2) pro-
vides: 
"Interrogation" includes any formal or in-
formal questioning in which an incriminat-
ing respmise either is saught or is a reason-
able consequence of such questioning. 
Left for further litigation is the question of 
whether military interrogators must give 
Miranda warnings prior to asking what are 
typically characterized as threshold or pedi-
gree questioning. The civilian courts have gen-
erally recognized no such requirement40 but in 
those military cases where, for example, the 
suspect's identity was in issue, failure to give 
the Miranda warnings was fatal. 41 However, 
where identity is not in· issue or where the 
individual is not a suspect, the courts will not 
normally require the Miranda warnings.42 
Still exempt from Mirand~eptpia warnings 
are the spontaneo1,1s or voh,mt~er~d statemehts 
from the suspect.43 And interrogations which 
are affectedonly bythe Article ~ (a) privilege 
against self-incrimi~ati9I. qo not inclMd,~ a 
right t<L£.Ounsel. 44 
The Supreme Court language in Miranda 
required that a suspect receive warnings advis-
ing him of the right to the presence of an attor-
ney, either retained or appointed. Other lan-
guage indicated that denial of counsel based on 
indigency would not be "supportable by reason 
or logic."45 The Court noted: 
In order fully to apprise a person interro-
gated of the extent ·of his rights under this 
system then, it is necessary to warn him not 
only tha,t he has the right to consult with an 
a,ttorney, but a~so that if he is indigent a 
lawyer will be appointed to represent him.46 
5 
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The Court of Military Appeals in Tempia, em-
phasized the foregoing language noting that for 
service members being interrogated, indigency 
could not serve as a bar to the right to counsel 
under MirandaY Tempia, in applying Miranda 
to military interrogations, neither expanded 
nor contracted the Miranda rights. 
However, in the 1969 Manual for Courts-
Martial the framers expanded the Miranda 
rights for service members to include either a 
civilian counsel or appointed military counsel. 
No showing of indigency was required. 48 Sub-
sequent military rights-warnings cards49 and 
waiver certificates50 broadened the ManWLl 
rights by informing the military suspects of 
the additional dght to individual military 
counsel if reasonably available. 
The new Military Rules of Evidence change 
this. First, as to the indigency language, the 
Court of Military Appeals had in two decisions, 
United States v. Clark51 and United States v. 
Hofbauer, 52 held that because Tempia was used 
only to apply Miranda, the 1969 Manual lan-
guage was too broad. A service member was en-
titled to appointed counsel only if, in Miranda's 
image, he could not afford a civilian counsel. 
But the indigency issue has apparently now 
shifted back to favoring the 1969 Manual lan-
guage. Rule 305 (d) (2), provides: 
Counsel. When a person entitled to counsel 
under this rule requests counsel, a judge advo-
cate or law specialist within the meaning of 
Article 1 Or an individual certified in accord-
ance with Article 27 (b) shaU be provided by 
the United States at no expense to the person 
and without regard to the person's indigency 
or lack thereof before the interrogation may 
proceed [emphasis added]. 
The apparent intent of the drafters was to 
overrule Clark and Hofbauer. A military 
suspect is, under the new rules, entitled to ap-
pointed military counsel regardless ·of indi-
gency. 
The second major issue regarding limitations 
of the military suspect's right to counsel is 
whether the suspect should be entitled to an 
individually requested military counsel. The 
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new rules again make a change. A military 
suspect, under the new rules, 'Will not be en-
titled to an individually requested military 
counsel at an interrogation. Even with this new 
limitation the military suspect's right to coun-
self will remain broader than his civilian coun-
terpart's right. In theory, at least, the civilian 
suspect must make some indication of indigency 
before receiving an appointed counsel. The 
military suspect may receive a military counsel 
by simply .so indicating to his interrogators. 
D. Invoking the Right-Waiving the Right 
The preceding sections centered on delinea-
tion of the Miranda-Tempia rights warnings. 
Once the warnings are given to the military 
suspect a series of new issues arise. We turn 
first to the situation where the suspect requests 
to see counsel. Several options are available to 
the interrogators. 
First, they may decide to either allow the 
suspect to arrange for counsel or they may 
themselves contact an attorney for the purpose 
of advising the suspect. If they decide not to 
allow the suspect to contact an attorney, then 
they may either release him or hold him for a 
reasonable time while continuing their investi-
gation. 53 They may not, however, continue to 
que.stion the suspect. 54 
Should the suspect indicate a willingness to 
forego the services of an attorney, then the 
interrogators may continue their questioning. 
The burden of establishing a voluntary waiver 
of the right to counsel rests on the Government. 
Although a written waiver is not a prerequisite 
to admissibility of a military suspect's state-
ments under the new rules, the existence of 
such certainly assists the prosecutor in meeting 
his burden.55 The suspect's "silence" when 
asked whether he wishes to see counsel does not 
in itself establish a waiver. 56 If the suspect does 
not decline affirmatively the right to counsel, 
the prosecutor must establish the waiver by a 
preponderance of the evidence. 57 
Some special problems are present for the 
Government if the suspect's statements were 
6 
made a.fter he initially indicated a desire'to see 
a counsel. Although language in Miranda seems 
to prohibit any so-called follow-up questioning 
(or conversation designed to elicit a response) 
later Supreme Court decisions apparently make 
allowance for it. For example, in Michigan v. 
Mosely58 the court stated that if a statement is 
later obtained the test to be applied is whether 
the suspect's rights to cut off questioning have 
been "scrupulously honored.'' 59 The Court of 
Military Appeals has followed suit in several 
recent cases. In United States v. Hill,60 the 
court allowed for subsequent questioning but 
found no waiver under the facts presented. But 
in United State[!. v. Quin:tarwP the Government 
was able to sustain its burqep .9f ~howing 
waiver, which in the court's estimation is very 
heavy when the statement follows an invoca-
tion of the Miranda--Tempia rights. Under 
law, there is no per se exclusion of those later 
statements. 62 
The "subsequent statement" scenario occurs 
in a variety of situations. Most arise in the 
hours or days following the invocation. Typi-
cally, the investigators fo1Iow up with an in-
quiry as to whether the suspect has in fact seen 
or spoken with a lawyer or if he has changed 
his mind. Most military courts recognize the 
validity of such a procedure.63 A related point 
here,· and discussed more fully in later sections, 
is that if the investigators know that the 
suspect is represented by counsel, notice must 
be given to that counsel of any further ques-
tioning. 
E. Effect of Incomplete Warnings: The, 
Miranda Exclusionary Rule · 
To give meaning to its mandate, the Supreme 
Court in Miranda set out its exclusionary rule: 
The prosecution may not use statements, 
whether exculpatory ot inculpatory, stem-
ming from custodial interrogation of the de-
fendant unless it . demonstrates the use of 
procedural safeguards effective to secure the 
privilege against self-incrimination. 6~ 
.1 
The military adopted the foregoing rule in the 
1969 Manual for Courts-Martial.65 But as. in 
other areas of M%'randa, 66 the Supreme Court. 
has liberalized its application of Miranda. In 
Harris v. N6.W York, 61 the court ruled that in-
complete or erroneous Miranda warnings could 
nonetheless be used to impeach the accused's 
testimony. The Harris rule, however, was spe-
cifically rejected by the Court of Military Ap-
peals in United States v~ J9rdon. 68 1;'}}e court 
noted that the Supreme Court's decision in 
Harris would determine the issue it it turned 
solely on constitutionaJ construction. However, 
the court continued, the 1969 Manual proscrip-
tion had the force of law, under congressional 
delegation of power to the President, and would 
apply until changed. It has been changed. 
The new Military Rules of Evidence ll()W 
bring the military exclusionary rule more in 
line with current civilian practice. The appli-
cable rule, Rule 304 (b), allows statements 
obtained after faulty Miranda warnings to be 
used for impeachment. 69 Whether faulty 
Miranda warnings in a military interrogation 
will void any other derivative evidence is ~~g1 
undecided. The Supreme Court has not allowed 
Harris-type statements to serve a~a validb~sis 
for probable C~l}e to search.70 Note that not 
ali defective Miranda· wa~nings. are. neces~_~rily 
fatal. Although an investigator's mistakes in 
giving the Article 31 (b) warnings almost al-
ways call for the exclusion of any resulting 
statements,71 there are several military cases 
which allow for "substantial compliance" in 
giving the right to counsel warnings. For ex-
ample/in United States v. Wilcox 72 the investi-
gator told the suspect that he had a. right to 
individual military counsel at his own expense. 
The court noted that the advice was clearly 
wrong but that substantial compliance coupled 
with a lack of prejudice satisfied foundational 
requirements for the admissibility· of the 
suspect's statements. Now, of course, even 
those warnings not substantially complying 
with Miranda may be used for at least impeach-
ment. 
7 
DA Pam 27-50-88 
F. Summary 
The new Military Rules of Evidence obviously 
impact on application of the fifth amendment 
protections, the Mirand~empia warnings, to 
military interrogations. It is in this area that 
counsel can expect to see more conformity with 
civilian practice and should therefore find 
civilian precedent helpful in litigating the mat-
ter\ Particular note should be paid to those rules 
;hich. clarify and expand the definition of "cus-
todial interrogation,"73 establish new limits on 
the suspect's choice of counsel,74 and adopt the 
Supreme Court's decision in Harris v. New 
York. 75 Having examined the circumstances of 
the interrogation to determine if Miranda-
Tempia is applicable, counsel should next turn 
to consider whether any sixth amendment 
issues are involved. 
II. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO 
COUNSEL AT INTERROGATIONS 
It is in the area of thernilitary's application 
of the sixth amendment that we see the great-
est expansion of the susp~ct's right· to counsel 
at a military interrogation and at the same 
time the greatest potential for uncertainty. The 
seminal case is Escobedo v. Illinois76-a pre-
cursor to Miranda. In Escobedo the accused's 
request to see his defense counsel had been im-
properly thwarted by interrogators. But even 
absent a request from the suspect to see his 
counsel, sixth amendment rights may be vio-
lated. Two Supreme Court decisions, Massiah 
v. United States77 and Brewer v. Williams 78 are 
prime examples. In Massiah the accused, after 
arraignment, was questioned by a bugged in-
formant with his counsel present. His sixth 
amendment right to counsel, said the court, had 
been violated. A similar result occurred in 
Brewer where, after arraignment, the accused 
was engaged in "conversation" by a detective ;79 
the court found no waiver of the accused's sixth 
amendment rights. so In neither case did the 
accused request to see counsel, yet the sixth 
amendment right to counsel was improperly 
denied. 
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The military courts, relying on EscobedQ and 
its progeny have in the past generally followed 
the Supreme Court's rule. But in United States 
v. Turner,81 the Court of Military Appeals, 
broadened the sixth ame11dment protections to 
include an accused who .had not requested to 
see his attorney and who was not aware that 
an attorney had unsuccessfully attempted to 
see him prior to the interrogation. 
After being released to military investigators 
by state authorities, Private Shawn Turner was 
placed tn an interrogation room. In a neighbor-
ing office, a civilian attorney indicated to the 
investigators that he represented Turner on 
some other matters and considered himself 
counsel for Turner "generally"; his request to 
see Turner was denied. The subsequent inter-
rogation did not include advice to Turner of the 
availability of an attorney. He waived his 
rights and confessed. The Army Court of Mili-
tary Review found no denial of the accused's 
rights to counsel82 but the Court of Military 
Appeals reversed, incorporating the dissenting 
opinion of the lower court's decision.83 
The court noted that the civilian attorney's 
announcement that he represented the accused 
was sufficient . for the investigators to have 
assumed that he in fact was the accused's ~t­
torney. Citing several state decisions, and reiy-
ing principally on People v. Donovan,B4 the 
court held that the investigators' blocka.de had 
frustrated the accused's sixth ainendfuei1t 
rights to counsel. In effect, a miiitary suspect's 
counsel may now invoke the "right to see 
counsel." 
At face value, Turner mandates a rule not 
yet required by any Supreme Court opiniori.85 
The decision's full impact is yet to be seen. As 
a practical matter, when investigators are con-
fronted by art "attorney" for the suspect, a few 
questions of the visitor may reveal whether in 
fact a relationship approximating an attorney-
client relationship in fact exists with the 
suspect.86 
Note that Rule 305 (d) (1) (A), discussed 
earlier, 87 requires that counsel warnings be 
given at any interrogations conducted after the 
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suspect is under restrai11t or charges have been 
preferred. This may solve in part any future 
Tu-rner-type problems related to determining 
when the right to counsel attaches. It is safe to 
conclude that upon the occurrence of either of 
the foregoing events, both of the applicable 
fifth and sixth amendment rights will be trig-
gered for military interrogations. ss 
Our discussion to this stage has centered .on 
twoconstitutionally-based protections. We turn 
now to the third and fimil f~cet, a notice require-
ment that rests not on .the Constitution, but 
rather on the Uniform Code of Military Justice. 
III. NOTICE TO COl;r:tfSEL OF 
INTERROGATION 
The third and final "rig.ht" to counsel, a 
notice requirement, rests in part on a perceived 
need to· prevent law enforcement officials from 
depriving a suspect of applicable fifth and sixth 
amendment rights. Simply pqt, if the suspect 
has an attorney, the interrogators niust give 
notice to that attorney of any. proposed interro-
gations. This third "right," however, finds no 
consistent or clear application in the chiilian 
courts. Unless sixth amendment rights are in-
volved, that is, the right to counsel has attached, 
civilian courts will generally allow questioning 
of the suspect without prior notice to his coun-
seJ.89 Clearly, a different ru1e applies to military 
interrogations. 
The military's notice requirement is grounded 
in the Court of Military Appeals decision; in 
United States v. Mc0mber. 99 Chief Judge 
Fletcher, writing for the court, noted that the 
leanings of the court had been toward a notice 
rule and stated: 
If the right to counsel is to retain any vital-
ity, the focus in testing for prejudice must be 
readjusted where an investigator questions 
an accused known to be represented by coun-
sel. We therefore hold that once an investi-
gator is on notice that an attorney has under~ 
taken to represent an individual in a military 
crb:nj11al investigation, further questioning 
of the accused without affording counsel rea-
sonable opportunity to be present renders 
any statement obtained involuntary under 
Article 31 (d) of the Uniform Code.91 
The rational for the rule was derived from 
Article 27 of the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice-not the sixth amendment. 
McOmber in laying a broader, more protec-
tive statutory right to counsel, did not answer 
the question of whether notice was required if 
a different offense was later discovered and the 
investigators wished to renew questioning of 
the suspect. Nor did it answer a key issue of 
whether the questioning agent needed "actual" 
notice that an acused was represented by coun-
sel. Each question has since been addressed by 
the court. 
A. interrogation for Different Offense 
Apparently, if the offenses under investiga-
tion are in any way related, McOmber will, 
apply. For example, in United States v. 
Lowry/2 both interrogations dealt with the 
accused.'s possible role in the arson of several 
buildings. Although each interrogation dealt 
with different buildings, the court was unwill-
ing to make "subtle distil~ctions" that require 
the separation of offense occurring within the 
same general area within a short period of 
time. 93 Recently, in United States v. Little-
john/4 the court held that no notice was re-
quited where the offenses in question were 
committed within two days of each other but 
involved distinct and unrelated matters. 95 
h:r~mportant point here is the "subtle dis-
tinction" proscription in Lowry, supra. If the 
offenses are not clearly distinct and unrelated, 
the prudent investigator should give the M c-
Omber notice to the suspect's counsel. That 
assumes of course that the investigator has 
notice that a defense counsel is representing 
the suspect. Despite its holding in Littlejohn, 
the court will continue to .. cl~ely examine the 
investigator's actions and motives. If bad faith 
in apparent, there should be no doubt that the 
court will refuse to make "subtle" distinctions. 
9 
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B. "Notice" of Representation by Counsel 
Recall that the Mcmb~r notice i13 required 
where an investigator is on notice that an at-
torney has undertaken to represent an individ-
ual in a military criminal investigation. A 
number of decisions from both the CotJrt. of 
Military Appeals and the various serviee ap-
pellate courts have concluded that in· the ab.:-
sence of bad faith, investigators will only be 
required to give the McOmber notice if they 
have actual knowledege that the suspect is rep-
resented. In United States v. Harris/ 6 the 
Court of Military Appeals declined to extend 
McOmber's mandate to inclu9.e arequirement 
that the investigators inquire of the suspect 
whether an attorney-client relationship exists. 
And in United States v. Littlejohn, supra, the 
court rejected the defense argument that Mc-
Omber notice should have been given to the 
defense counsel who would have inevitably 
represented the accused. The McOmber rule, 
according to the court is not concerned with 
probable representation but rather with "an 
existing attorney-client relationship."97 Again, 
this area is suspect ; in both cases the court was 
persuaded by the reasonableness of the investi-
gator's actions. Evidence of bad faith could 
easily change the results reached in those 
cases. 98 
Rule. 305 (e) of the new Military Rules of 
Evidence includes a McOmber notice require-
ment: 
Notice to Counsel. When a person subject to 
the Uniform Code of Military Justice who is 
required to give warnings under subdivision 
(c) intends to question an accused or person 
suspected of an offense and knows or reason-
ably should know that counsel either has been 
appointed for or retained by the accused or 
suspect with respect to that offense, the cou~ 
sel must be notified of the intended interroga-
tion and given a reasonable time in which to 
attend before the interrogation may proceed. 
Note that this new rule expands the McOmber 
rule beyond the limits set by Littlejohn and 
Harris, supra. 99 Whether the investigator 
knows or should know of an existing attorney-
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client relationship will obviously depend on the 
factors surrounding each interrogation. 100 
One defense method of short-circuiting 
claims of investigator ignorance might be for 
defense counsel to formally advise law enforce-
ment personnel of his or her role as the . ac-
cused's attorney.101 The potential impact of this 
new rule probably requires that the farsighted 
investigator simply ask the suspect if an attor-
net has been appointed or retained. The inves-
tigator surely . runs the risk of the suspect 
answering in the affirmative and invoking his 
right to counsel but ·the benefits of clearing the 
air and avoiding a possible ·McOmber notice 
problem must not be overlooked. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In litigating the various issues associated 
with this aspect of military interrogations, 
counsel should resist the urge to rush into an 
analysis which treats only the broader, more 
confusing, issue of "right to counsel." Each 
particular "right" should first be examined 
separately. In any case in which an interroga-
tion of the accused is in issue, counsel should 
apply a six-step analysis: 
First, were right to counsel warnings re-
quired either by case law or the new rules of 
evidence? 
Second, if the accused gave a statement with-
out requesting counsel, is there evidence of a 
valid waiver of the right to counsel? 
Third, if the accused gave a, statement after 
initially re·questing counsel, ~8 there evidence 
to sustain the government's heavy burden of 
showing a valid waiver? 
Fourth, if there was no complianc·e with the 
requirements to give the applicable right to 
counsel warnings, is the statement otherwise 
voluntary and therefore admissible for im-
peachment purposes under the new rules? 
Fifth, did the accused's counsel at any time 
prior to, or during the interrogation, unsuc-
10 
cessfully attempt to see the a()cused? If so, 
there may be a sixth amendment issue. 
Sixth, was the interrogator required to give 
McOmber notice to counsel? If notice was 
given, was the counsel given a reasonable 
opportunity to be present? 
Counsel's analysis should begin, but in no way 
end with these six issues. They should be used 
as primary tools for focusing on the key areas. 
Each inquiry should then be further subjected 
to detailed analysis using applicable case law 
and the new rules as a template for specifically 
framing the issues to be litigated. In summary, 
particular attention should be paid to the ma-
jor innovations in the Military Rules of Evi-
dence which: 
1. Expand the right to counsel warnings to 
interrogations not necessarily custodial 
but occurring after charges are preferred 
or pretrial restraint imposed ;102 
2. Adopt the Supreme Court decision in 
Harris v. New York; 103 
3. Limit the suspect's right to individually 
requested military counsel ;104 
4. Expand the McOmber notice requirement 
to cases where the investigator reason-
ably should know that counsel has been 
retained or appointed.105 
These recent changes reflect a somewhat 
spirited growth of the rights to counsel at mili-
tary interrogations and so mark a major step 
in the development of military criminal law. 
The potential for litigating right to c~p,nsel 
issues is ripe and the new Military Rules of 
evidence and recent case law insure ample 
opportunity for litigation. 
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The Impact of Article 82 of Protocol I to The 1949 Geneva Conventions on the 
Organization and Operation of a Division SJA Office 
Captain Michael C. Denny, JAGC, Olfice of The Sta.(fJudge Advocate 
Fort Stew(J;rt, Geo'rgia 
Currently, the State Department is reviewing 
and drafting comments to the Protocols to . the 
.1949 Geneva Conventions. The purpose of this 
Article is to determine what impact Article 82 
of Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions 1 
may have on the operati~n of a Division SJA 
Office if they are adopted. The effect of Ar~icle 
82 clearly depends on the interpretation of the 
Article. A narrow reading would require ·no 
change in peace or war. A reading with a view 
·toward its spirit and underlying rationale may 
well require action by both the SJA and the 
Division Commander. The starting point of the 
analysis must begin with the origin of the Pro-
tocol. 
''i' 
Origin of the Protocol 
In 1971 Hie International Committee of the 
Red Cross (ICRC) invited a group of govern-
mental experts on various aspects of the . Law 
of War to Geneva to consider modifications to 
the Geneva Conventions of 1949:• Experts, rep-
resenting ovef 70 countries, met from 1971 to · 
1973 and submitted proposed texts of two new 
protocols to tM ICRC. Beginning in 1974, four 
diplomatic conferences were held. On 10 June 
1977, in the final act of the conferences, two 
proposed protocols were signed. . 
Protocol I modernizes of the law of interna-
tional armed conflicts with specific sections 
dealing with such topics as medical aircraft, 
works and instaJlations containing dangerous 
. forces, and repression of breaches of the proto-
col. Protocol ·• If expands on the third article 
common to· all the 1949 Geneva conventions. 
This concerned conflicts not of an international 
nature. The specific concern of this paper is 
Article 82 of Protocol I-Legal Advsors in 
Armed Forces. This article requires legal ad-
visors to be available to give advice to military 
commanders on the application of the Conven-
tions and the Protocols and to give advice on 
instruction to be given to members . of the 
Armed Forces. 
The committee of experts and the diplomatic 
conference both recognized that the law of war 
would be more effectively observed if a legal 
advisor were available to commanders. This is 
an implicit recognition that the law of war as 
stated in both the Geneva and Hague conven-
tions is becoming more detailed and specific 
over a broad range of topics. Requiring a legal 
advisor would be a natural consequence of the 
increased complexity of the law. 
It is also a recognition that the commanders 
are responsible for their actions as professional 
soldiers. They are presumed to know the law 
and will be held accountable for their actions 
whether they have had any specific training in 
the law of war or not. 
Analysis of the Language of Article 82 
In order to evaluate the impact of Article 82 
one must look closely to the language of the 
article and note what it states and perhaps just 
as significantly, what it does not state. 
In 1973 the draft text from the, gover~me~tal 
experts (then Art. 71) stated 
